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NO. 4 JANUARY 2021 Introduction 
Environmental Rights and Conflicts 
over Raw Materials in Latin America 
The Escazú Agreement Is Ready to Come into Force in 2021 
Günther Maihold and Viktoria Reisch 
On 5 November 2020 Mexico ratified the so-called Escazú Agreement, a treaty between 
Latin American and Caribbean states on establishing regional transparency and environ-
ment standards, as the eleventh country to do so. The prescribed quorum of ratifica-
tions has thus been attained, and the agreement can come into force in 2021. This will 
launch an innovative multilateral instrument that is intended to create more citizen par-
ticipation and improve the assertion of citizens’ rights in environmental matters. In 
Latin America, economic interests dominate when it comes to the exploitation of raw 
materials; furthermore, there is a large number of conflicts over resources. The agree-
ment thus offers affected indigenous tribes and human-rights defenders more oppor-
tunities for information, participation and access to the justice system in environmen-
tal matters. Despite this binding first step, some leading countries in the region have 
so far failed to ratify the agreement. Many of them are reluctant to join, arguing that 
certain provisions violate their national sovereignty and their freedom of decision. For 
Germany and Europe, the agreement offers new leverage for drafting supply chain laws. 
 
By the end of 2020, a total of twelve Latin 
American and Caribbean countries had 
ratified this “Agreement on Access to Infor-
mation, Public Participation and Justice 
in Environmental Matters in Latin America 
and the Caribbean”. The “Escazú Agreement” 
is considered a breakthrough in efforts to 
safeguard environmental rights. The region 
has a long history of destroying ecosystems 
while exploiting natural resources for 
export (extractivism). The socio-ecological 
conflicts associated with this form part of 
the context of lasting violence on the sub-
continent. 
The agreement, concluded in Escazú 
(Costa Rica) in March 2018, is based on Prin-
ciple 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on En-
vironment and Development, which estab-
lishes transparency, participation and access 
to justice for citizens impacted by environ-
mental problems. It was signed in 2018, 
after four years of tough negotiations be-
tween 24 countries in the region. The ratifi-
cation process, which began in September 
2018, is proving to be just as difficult. 
Mexico’s ratification ensured that the 
quorum was reached for the agreement to 
come into force in 2021. However, impor-
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tant countries such as Brazil, Chile, Peru and 
Venezuela, which are active extractors and 
exporters of raw materials, have not yet fol-
lowed suit. On the contrary: there is massive 
resistance, especially from business sectors, 
to the scope of the regulations, which are 
seen as interfering in national sovereignty. 
It has been claimed that, with the agree-
ment in effect, countries would no longer 
be able to make independent decisions 
about how their territories are used. Some 
parliaments, for example in Peru and Para-
guay, have therefore removed the issue 
from their agendas. However, other coun-
tries, including Colombia, have initiated 
ratification processes and can be expected 
to join. 
The Four Pillars of the 
Escazú Agreement 
The agreement creates a joint regional legal 
framework that brings together four ele-
ments to enable new forms of sustainable 
development in Latin America: access to 
environmental information; the right to 
participation; access to justice for citizens 
affected by resource exploitation; and pro-
tective mechanisms for environmental 
activists. The principles of prevention, pre-
caution and monitoring are thus connected 
to legal guarantees by environmental and 
social impact studies and compensation for 
damage. The agreement is intended to have 
a preventative effect and specifically pre-
empt the escalation of socio-ecological con-
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The Escazú Agreement is the first 
document in the world to stipulate pro-
cedural safeguards to protect activists who 
campaign for the preservation of natural 
resources. The agreement therefore also 
exceeds the European Aarhus Conven-
tion from 1998. By conferring the rights 
of information, participation and legal 
protection on individuals, Latin America 
will simultaneously expand possibilities 
for implementing international and 
national environmental standards more 
lastingly. 
The participatory formats stipulated 
in the agreement are intended as means 
for conflict prevention and for upholding 
fundamental human rights, such as those 
already contained in Convention 169 of 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO; 
short form: ILO 169) for the protection of 
indigenous peoples. They are meant to lay 
down regional minimum standards. Every 
country has to accept the formulated norms 
so as to guarantee the exercise of the rights 
referred to. The norms are to be met by 
states implementing measures to improve 
their national institutions; they also have to 
create mechanisms to manage information 
and optimise decision-making procedures 
that include intercultural and gender-spe-
cific approaches. In particular, signatories 
commit to preventing environmental dam-
age and ensuring that environmental rights 
are respected. Crucially, this includes busi-
nesses: public and private companies (espe-
cially large companies) are to draw up sus-
tainability reports to disclose their social 
and ecological record. 
Current reality is far removed from this. 
Often, deposits are identified and developed 
without the local population being involved 
or consulted. Transparency imperatives are 
also violated in information on the projects’ 
environmental impact, long-term effects 
and emissions; possibilities for lodging com-
plaints are systematically subverted. The 
agreement’s ultimate objective is therefore 
to transform socio-ecological conflicts, with 
the particular aim of preventing them from 
turning violent. A further important con-
cern is to protect environmental activists 
from intimidation and hostility as much 
as from threats to life and limb. 
Socio-Ecological Conflicts 
Since the turn of this century, (civil-society) 
organisations and academics have been 
recording a rise in land and environmental 
conflicts in Latin America – initially pri-
marily in the Andean countries, but since 
the 2010s in all Latin American states with-
out exception. In the Environmental Justice 
Atlas, Latin America leads the world in the 
number of environmental conflicts. 
Socio-ecological conflicts refer to the 
mobilisation of usually local communities 
or civil-society organisations against eco-
nomic activities whose environmental 
consequences are a key element of their 
complaints. Typical expressions are protest 
marches, squatting, street blockades or 
hunger strikes. The term “environmental 
conflict” will here be used mostly synony-
mously with “socio-ecological conflict”. 
Restrictions on reporting and monitoring 
mean that the number of unreported cases 
in other parts of the world is expected to be 
substantial; nevertheless, statistics indicate 
that many countries in the Americas are 
experiencing more conflicts. The mining 
sector is particularly conflictual. Over 40 
percent of the environmental conflicts in 
the continent’s ten most conflict-ridden 
countries are linked to extraction of min-
erals (see Chart). Sources also indicate that 
violence is escalating in other sectors, for 
instance in energy production, which is 
closely linked to energy-intensive mining. 
Alongside economic issues such as no rise 
in employment in the productive sector, 
dependency on the price of raw materials 
on the world market, and high ecological 
costs, there are also a large number of 
related social divides. Rarely can a conflict 
resulting from extractivism be categorised 
as a single-issue conflict. Often concerns 
revolve around the destruction of habitat 
and biodiversity, the displacement or re-
settling of local communities, or obtaining 
an adequate share in the income derived 
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from resource mining and being involved 
in decision-making processes. 
Risks for Land and 
Environmental Defenders 
The group of actors most impacted by such 
conflicts are those who campaign for land 
and environmental rights in Latin America. 
They are, to quote the title of the 2015 re-
port by the international non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) Global Witness, On Dan-
gerous Ground in Latin America. The report 
calls 2015 the deadliest year for such actors 
since it began recording cases in 2002. How-
ever, subsequent years saw further rises. 
Numerous Latin American countries 
feature on the list of the most dangerous 
countries for activists on land and environ-
mental issues, above all Colombia, Brazil 
and Mexico. The mining sector, which is 
heavily conflict-laden, also has the highest 
number of murdered activists. Defenders 
of indigenous rights, who are primarily 
concerned about preserving indigenous 
environmental and territorial rights, are 
under disproportionately high pressure. 
In the majority of cases, murder victims, 
or their entourage, have previously been 
threatened or attacked. 
In its annual report, CIVICUS, a global 
alliance of civil-society organisations and 
activists, lists the five most frequent repres-
sive acts in Latin America: detention of pro-
testers, attacks on journalists, intimidation 
and use of excessive force against protesters, 
and detention of journalists. There are also 
subtler forms of restriction, which are often 
not considered a direct threat, such as poor 
consultation processes, which refuse to give 
certain groups of people a legal voice, or 
threats and pressure by companies (includ-
ing state-run companies) to coopt activists 
so as to pre-empt conflicts in the first place. 
The intensity of the violence against human-
rights defenders can therefore not be meas-
ured by the number of assassinations alone, 
but must also take into account the many 
non-deadly attacks. 
Profit interests, which play a key role 
in the mining of natural resources, are the 
reason for the particularly high risk to land 
and environmental defenders in Latin 
America. These interests can gain the upper 
hand over the duty to protect, especially in 
a situation where corruption is rampant, 
governments are weak, and poverty reigns. 
The above-mentioned reports also repeatedly 
point to the shared responsibility of govern-
ments and companies. The latter, the reports 
say, criminalise land and environmental 
activists and prosecute them under the law 
to systematically repress protests. 
Many countries flout the right of indig-
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down in the above-mentioned Convention 
169 adopted by the International Labour 
Organisation. Countries that have signed 
the convention are supposed to secure the 
free, prior and informed consent of indig-
enous peoples for investment projects in 
the raw materials sector. Most Latin Ameri-
can countries have even ratified the con-
vention (with the exception of Uruguay, 
Panama and El Salvador); some have also 
absorbed its fundamental principles into 
their constitutions. However, there is 
nothing like systematic implementation. 
As with human-rights standards, it is 
often the case that countries with progres-
sive environmental and consultation laws 
(such as Brazil or Peru) fail to live up to 
their voluntary commitments. However, 
extractive interests are not solely respon-
sible for the injustices: so are the inter-
national community, which has not yet 
issued binding rules, and in some cases 
national and international development 
banks involved in infrastructure measures 
and projects for natural resource exploita-
tion. Infringements or human-rights vio-
lations are seldom thoroughly investigated; 
legal proceedings or convictions are rare. 
This far-reaching impunity perpetuates 
the spiral of violence and leads to a loss of 
confidence in national justice systems. In 
contrast, allowing broad access to informa-
tion and involvement in decision-making 
processes has the potential to resolve con-
flicts before they escalate. 
Resistance to the Agreement 
Many large countries that play a crucial role 
in Latin American foreign policies have so 
far refused to ratify the Escazú Agreement. 
Along with Brazil, which has shown no in-
tention to ratify, they include Peru, which 
has a particularly high number of land and 
environmental conflicts, as well as Chile, 
where environmental conflicts have been 
increasing for years. This is the more re-
markable since Chile was one of the initia-
tors of the agreement. To date, however, it 
has not even signed it. 
Chile: A Radical Change of 
Direction 
Chile had a leading role in the preparations 
and negotiations for the Escazú Agreement. 
After about two years of preparation, the 
Santiago Decision to adopt the prepared 
document was announced in the Chilean 
capital in November 2014. Chile along with 
Costa Rica was awarded the co-presidency 
for the subsequent negotiations. There were 
a total of nine rounds of negotiations over 
the next four years. 
Chile’s U-turn came a few days before 
the final text was adopted in early October 
2018. A vital influence was probably the 
result of the 2017 presidential elections, 
which saw the centre-left government of 
President Michelle Bachelet replaced by 
a rightwing-conservative coalition under 
Sebastián Piñera, which attaches greater 
value to economic interests. 
As the main motive for rejecting the 
agreement, Chile’s decision-makers cur-
rently in office cite their concern that Chile 
might lose sovereignty and be subject to 
interference in internal affairs and par-
ticularly in bilateral disputes (for instance 
with neighbouring Bolivia). Most recently, 
the Chilean government argued that 
national legislation already contained all 
the key regulations of the Escazú Agree-
ment. Special laws for environmental 
activists, it claimed, would privilege the 
latter, thus creating unequal treatment 
of various human-rights groups before 
the law. It is true that Chile has adopted 
legal regulations in areas that are also 
addressed by the agreement. Not least, 
these concern large state companies, such 
as the copper corporation CODELCO. Often, 
however, these national rules only cover 
parts of the Escazú proposals or are only 
inadequately implemented at best. It is 
therefore essential not only to adjust the 
legislation, but also to create additional 
transparency obligations via a national plan 
for implementing the Escazú Agreement, 
and, above all, to ensure that their imple-
mentation in line with regional standards 
can be monitored. 
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In December 2019 Chile chaired the UN 
Climate Conference (COP25). Many Chilean 
civil-society organisations campaigning for 
environmental and human rights expected 
the government to change its position on 
the Escazú Agreement so as to set an exam-
ple on the international stage. Their disap-
pointment was the greater when the gov-
ernment vehemently refused to sign the 
agreement and provided only weak leader-
ship for the COP25, which was supposed 
to be held in Santiago de Chile, but was re-
located to Madrid following social protests 
in the country. 
Peru: Concerns about 
Autonomous Action in 
Exploiting Raw Materials 
In 2018 Peru’s then-environment minister 
Fabiola Muñoz was one of the first signa-
tories of the Escazú Agreement. The coun-
try was long seen as a strong advocate as 
well as a candidate for rapid ratification. 
Yet the latter kept being postponed during 
parliamentary debates on the treaty. The 
decision not to ratify the agreement was 
ultimately taken in October 2020, overrid-
ing the Peruvian president. 
The Viability of Criticism of the 
Agreement 
Both Chile and Peru argue that their right 
to sovereignty would be restricted if inter-
national courts were given jurisdiction. 
They also consider that NGOs are receiving 
disproportionately preferential treatment 
by being given a powerful voice in com-
plaints mechanisms through the right to 
participation laid down in the agreement. 
This carries the risk, the countries claim, 
that such NGOs could thwart mining and 
infrastructure projects that are vital for the 
national economy. Trade and industry asso-
ciations in particular have expressed grave 
concerns in public statements. They point 
to the rejection of the agreement by other 
economically powerful countries such as 
Brazil or members of the Pacific Alliance 
such as Peru, Chile, Colombia and Mexico 
(which had not yet ratified the Escazú 
Agreement at the time), who have founded 
a free trade area within this framework. 
Peru therefore argues that it might be at a 
competitive disadvantage and implies that 
the countries it names have good reasons 
for rejecting ratification. 
The arguments against the agreement 
advanced by Chile and Peru are weak. 
Article 3 of the Escazú Agreement reiterates 
the principles of a country’s unabated sov-
ereignty over its own natural resources and 
of the sovereign equality of all member 
states. This also includes a country’s free-
dom to set its environmental policy autono-
mously. Mexico’s ultimate ratification and 
the fact that Colombia is moving towards 
ratifying as well make the argument of a 
competitive economic disadvantage base-
less. The agreement obliges countries to 
shape their policies according to the duty 
to protect laid down in it; this would help 
them deal with international monitoring of 
their compliance with labour and environ-
ment standards. If Chile and Peru were to 
accept this duty to protect, their reputations 
might well benefit since their national legis-
lation would then meet international 
requirements. Moreover, the associated 
chances of participating in development 
programmes would make it easier for them 
to meet their duty to protect. 
This is the opportunity but also the chal-
lenge presented by the Escazú Agreement 
in the context of new international require-
ments to uphold human rights and due dili-
gence. Both Peru with its national ombuds-
person and Chile, for instance in its National 
Human Rights Institute, already have in-
stitutions tasked with observing and safe-
guarding basic rights – including in min-
ing with a view to the environment and to 
human rights. These enjoy a high degree 
of legitimacy in the eyes of the population, 
unlike other state bodies. Both countries 
thus have an institutional basis that would 
enable them to keep the commitments set 
out in the Escazú Agreement and simulta-
neously to strengthen their facilities for con-
flict prevention and management. 
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The Escazú Agreement and the 
Regulation of International 
Supply Chains 
As a regional agreement, the Escazú Agree-
ment will establish uniform transnational 
standards and set in motion a process to 
offset institutional and legislative asymme-
tries among the region’s various countries. 
The ultimate objective is to achieve the 
highest possible degree of equality between 
countries in the Escazú Agreement’s four 
pillars for protecting, safeguarding and pro-
moting access rights. By proceeding co-
operatively, the countries involved could 
exchange learning experiences and best-
practice patterns, which would also im-
prove the implementation of, and compli-
ance with, standards. As a concrete expres-
sion of the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, the Escazú 
Agreement along with the environmental 
standards set by the American Human 
Rights Convention (1969) could create syn-
ergies to shape a regionally uniform and 
binding framework for environmental and 
human-rights protection by companies and 
states. The efficacy of the agreement will 
depend on how robust the legal provisions 
and financial conditions are (for instance 
for environmental impact assessment 
studies and on how consistently the judi-
ciary enforces the provisions. 
While Latin America’s manufacturing 
industry is not part of supply chains on a 
large scale, the key focus of regulations like 
the Escazú Agreement is on the extensive 
responsibility of companies when it comes 
to extracting and processing raw materials. 
Current debates in Germany and Europe on 
supply chain laws are closely followed in 
the region, and the challenges that they 
pose to the corporate or state responsibility 
derived from them are discussed with a 
critical eye. The Escazú Agreement ad-
dresses regulatory facts that are also rele-
vant for contemporary debates on designing 
corporate responsibility. Lawmakers should 
therefore take up the standards formulated 
in the region (for instance in the Escazú 
Agreement) and include them in their con-
siderations. It is precisely this complemen-
tarity of international, regional and local 
norm-setting that could steer businesses 
towards a conduct that exceeds voluntary 
commitments. However, if the expectations 
and commitments to standards do not cor-
relate, this regulatory heterogeneity would 
impede efforts to generate greater attention 
and respect for human-rights and environ-
mental standards. 
The efficacy of both voluntary and legal 
regulations is disputed. Extensive standards 
of the kind that the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) is trying to 
establish, for instance, to create more trans-
parency in finances and more accountabil-
ity in the raw materials sector, are not at all 
applied uniformly in Latin America’s ex-
tractive countries. Mining-sector companies 
in particular have additionally implemented 
standards for audit certification on the basis 
of agreements already in force – for in-
stance via quality seals such as the FairTrade 
standard for gold or silver. However, such 
voluntary standards for corporate respon-
sibility should be rolled out with restraint 
in favour of increased coherence, which is 
ultimately in the companies’ interest too. 
To date, the rules have frequently not been 
applied to ancillary industries or local pro-
duction processes. 
Along with labour conditions, the main 
focus is on environmental consequences. 
For instance, in the case of copper extrac-
tion, the huge amounts of water used, the 
land use, energy use, mining overburden 
and long-term emissions must also be taken 
into account. The copper industry currently 
is beginning to record all these factors for 
mines and foundries, as part of voluntary 
monitoring processes; in future, they are to 
be collated under the quality seal Copper 
Mark. However, these transparency initia-
tives, including complementary general 
mining standards, such as the Initiative for 
Responsible Mining Assurance (IRMA), fall 
noticeably short of the Escazú regulations. 
Moreover, they do not stipulate any sanc-
tions to enforce due diligence in human 
and environmental rights, or to do justice 
to the duty to protect. The Escazú Agree-
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ment standards have the appropriate regu-
latory scope. Germany and Europe should 
therefore aim to make them binding for 
both European companies and government 
cooperation; they should also support imple-
mentation. This could be achieved through 
national action plans for human rights and 
the environment, as well as reports on the 
progress made in implementing the agree-
ment. 
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